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bstract
here is widespread agreement across the social sciences that institutions matter. Although there is widespread agreement that institutions shape
he behavior of actors, there are disagreements over the extent to which they actually influence individuals and the degree to which people can
hape them. This article argues that these disagreements derive from the fact that scholars are studying different institutions at different levels.
any misunderstandings within the social sciences result from the failure to understand that scholars are often studying different phenomena. This
roblem would appear to be particularly stark in the discipline of Business Administration because it draws on a variety of areas of study in the
ocial sciences.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ifferent  ways  of  understanding  institutions
North (1990) is widely considered to have provided the most
uccinct definition of institutions. He contends that there are∗ Correspondence to: Vito Dumas 284 (B1644BID), Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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ules and the latter are conventions and codes of behavior. They
onstrain actors through sets of incentives and disincentives
hat channel human behavior in a particular direction, thereby
reating stable structures that promote efficiency in human inter-
ctions by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. They
rovide structure and order by aligning the actions and expecta-
ions of individuals in a society. Interactions are more efficient
ecause perceptions and understandings are implicit and do not
ave to be explained or negotiated. According to Paul (1994)
nstitutions help coordinate actions between diverse actors in
ociety without the need for centralization, albeit by limiting
hat actors can do. Coordination is possible because actors share
istories that provide them consistent expectations. Pierson
2000) argues that the increasing returns that derive from the
xistence of an institution over time makes it difficult to dis-
odge even if another institution may be more efficient in the
bstract.
Some scholars argue that institutions practically determine
he actions of individuals. They claim that institutions define
references and power in society (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991;
helen & Steinmo, 1992), while also providing the shared mean-
ngs and cognitive frames that shape how human interpret the
ehavior of others (Fligstein, 2001; Hall & Taylor, 1996). They
hape preferences and even determine what people can imagine
hemselves doing (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Institutions are diffi-
ult to change because they shape the very choices individuals
ake when attempting to change them (Hall & Taylor, 1996).
istrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. Published
p://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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lthough North (1990) asserts that humans consciously design
nstitutions to help them efficiently meet their goals, Powell and
iMaggio (1991) argue that institutions are not human designs
ut rather evolve out of the particularities of a given historical
nd cultural context.
Scott (2007) has a less deterministic interpretation of insti-
utions, focusing more on intersubjectivity and individual
nterpretations rather than larger social processes. Cognitive
nstitutions, he argues, reflect the manner in which actors
nderstand their environment, whereby meaning arises through
nteractions and involve subjective interpretations and the social
onstruction of individual and collective actors. However, he
lso draws attention to what he terms are regulative and nor-
ative institutions. Regulative institutions are the rules of the
ame and consist of written and unwritten codes with enforce-
ent mechanisms. Normative institutions are norms and values
hat structure choices, emphasizing how things should be done
nd defining legitimate means to accomplish them. Even though
hey provide a stabilizing force in society, actors internalize them
o different degrees.
Schmidt (2010) contends that there four types of institutional
pproaches, namely rational choice, historical, sociological and
iscursive institutionalisms. Rational choice institutionalism
resumes that actors have fixed preferences and act rationally
o maximize their preferences. Institutions only influence actors
y incentivising actions and reducing uncertainties. Work using
his approach assumes that actors can understand the effects
f the institutions they create and often relies on functional-
st explanations for the existence of institutions. Sociological
nstitutionalism examines how actors follow rules and norms,
ssuming that identities and culture are the sources of inter-
sts for individuals. Human action is examined in terms of its
ymbolic and ceremonial purposes not utilitarian ones. This
pproach emphasizes how institutions shape actors and not how
ctors shape institutions. Historical institutionalism conceives of
nstitutions as being sets of regularized practices. It focuses on
ow they develop over time, often comparing institutions across
ountries.
Discursive institutionalism examines how actors generate and
egitimize ideas through a logic of communication, focusing
n the interactive process through which ideas are generated.
nstitutions provide the framework for discourse by defining
he range of ideas that are more or less acceptable in discur-
ive interactions. Schmidt (2010) argues that these four types
f institutionalisms should be considered complementarity to
ach other rather than different ways of understanding the same
henomena.
Williamson (2000) contends that institutions exist at four lev-
ls in any society. The first, and most general, are informal and
onsist of customs, traditions, norms, religion, etc. Although
hey are slow to change, they “have a lasting grip on the way
 society conducts itself” (Williamson, 2000: 597). The second
evel, the institutional environment, consists of formal rules such
s constitutions and laws. They emerge partially out of an evo-
utionary process and partially out of design. Governance, the
hird level, is the creation of contracts and agreements between a
imited number of groups in society. They are designed to reduce
b
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onflicts and set the basis for mutual benefits. The fourth level is
esource allocation. For companies, it is the level of the produc-
ion function and consists of institutions that guide the operation
f an organization. By contrast, governance describes the regu-
ation of operations between independent organizations. Lower
evels can have only limited influence on those levels imme-
iately above them, whereas upper levels impose clear limits
n lower ones. Williamson (2000) points out that the work of
conomists focuses on levels two and three in his framework.
Although many scholars across the social sciences claim to
se a neoinstitutional approach, they often fail to specify exactly
hich type of neoinstitutionalist approach they are following.
onsequently, scholars frequently misinterpret the work of oth-
rs even within their own discipline. Moreover, some scholars
ven seem to confuse the different approaches within their work
eading them to make misguided conclusions. This article now
urns to an analyze both of these points by examining the type
f institutionalist approachs used by Khanna and Palepu (1997)
nd Kostova, Roth, and Dacin (2008). These two works represent
eminal pieces in the areas of strategy and international business
espectively. This article suggests ways that both of these works
ould be improved by incorporating insights from some of the
eoinstitutionalist approaches described above.
xamples  of  the  application  of  neoinstitutional  theory
Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that emerging markets have
 number of “institutional voids” in product, capital and labor
arkets. The lack of a reliable business press and missing reg-
lations cause firms to have to reliable on their own financial
esources. The dearth of reliable sources of information in gen-
ral cause firms with strong brand names to gain more clients
han their rivals. The absence of adequate schools and training
nstitutes requires firms to train their own workers. In short, the
ack of institutions supporting the market cause firms to have
o vertical integrate activities that normally can be acquired on
he market. In emerging markets business groups are successful
ecause they have the capabilities to fill these voids.
This article by Khanna and Palepu focuses only on formal
nstitutions, overlooking the possible role that informal insti-
utions could play in facilitating the operation of the market.
air and Martib (2009) contend that the term institutional void
hould be used to describe only the lack of institutions sup-
orting markets, not the lack of institutions per se. Emerging
arkets have a number of institutions, many of which actu-
lly impede the operation of markets. In terms of Williamson’s
ramework level 2 institutions may be absent or deficient but
evel one institutions are always present. Furthermore, firms may
ctually be able to address deficiencies in institutions by work-
ng with a limited number of other firms and/or organizations
t level three in Williamson’s framework. In terms of Scott’s
pproach, this article by Khanna and Palepu focuses only on
egulative institutions, not on normative or cognitive ones.Kostova et al. (2008) contend that scholars in international
usiness exaggerate the degree to which local environments
hape the behavior of multinational companies in foreign
ountries. They contend that these companies operate in three
214 D. Friel / Revista de Administração 52 (2017) 212–214
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politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative perspective (pp. 1–32).ostova Informal Cognitive Soc
hanna and Palepu Formal Regulative Rat
istant organizational fields, namely the ones of their home
ountry, their host country, and the international community.
y being in three fields at the same time, the strategies of these
rms are said not to be limited any one of them, enabling them
o largely ignore the isomorphic pressures of their host environ-
ents.
By deploying terms such as isomorphism and organizational
elds, this article by Kostova, Roth and Dacin seems to draw
n sociological institutionalism because these terms are devel-
ped in this area of research. As mentioned above, this type
f institutionalism emphasizes symbolic and ceremonial pur-
oses focusing on norms, identity and culture and the way these
nstitutions shape actors. According to this form of institutional-
sm firms cannot simply avoid or ignore institutions, particularly
nformal ones. These authors seem to confuse the sociological
pproach with the rational choice one. Moreover, they contend
hat governments in host countries do not expect these compa-
ies to adapt their practices to their countries’ contexts.
Given that isomorphic pressures result from general insti-
utional settings and not from the decisions of policy makers
o consciously enforce them, it would be difficult to imag-
ne how MNCs could actually be excluded from isomorphic
ressures. Consequently, the choices available to subsidiaries of
ultinational corporations would seem more limited than those
vailable to local firms. The behavior of the former is limited by
somorphic pressures from their headquarters and from the local
etting in which they operate, while the decisions of the latter are
nly shaped by the isomorphic pressure of their local context.
lthough these authors draw on the sociological approach they
each conclusions from a rational choice institutionalist perspec-
ive that focuses on formal institutions and regulations. In terms
f Williamson these scholars claim to be studying level one insti-
utions but they are using assumptions derived from level two
nstitutions. Although these authors appear to study institutions
t level one and two in Williamson’s framework, they seem to
ttribute a level of flexibility in choice that is really only available
o firms a levels three and four in it.
Table 1 provides a summary of the concepts on which each
f these articles draws within the four major approaches to insti-
utions discussed above.
onclusion
The neoinstitutionalist approach across the disciplines in the
ocial sciences has played an important role in drawing the
ttention of scholars to the important role played by institu-
ions in coordinating activities between individuals as well as
Wical institutionalism Customs and norms as well as formal rules
choice institutionalism Formal rules
hose between groups. Although there are significant differ-
nces in the approaches outlined above in regards to the degree
o which institutions determine the behavior of actors, all of
hem agree that they are critical to the functioning of any soci-
ty. However, in order for progress to be made in this field
cholars have to be careful not only to properly understand
he approach they are using but also the potential insights that
ould be derived from other theories addressing levels and types
f institutions. Work of this kind would help stimulate better
iscussions that could eventually lead to more fruitful dialogs
cross approaches, thereby potentially advancing theory even
urther.
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